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LOYALTY TESTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR*
RP 'xH S. BROWN, JR.,t AND JoHN D. FASSETTTT RADITIONAL nonacademic standards for admission to the bar require the
applicant to be of good moral character and to support the Constitu-
tion. 1 The inquiry of this paper is to what extent these comfortable
norms nowadays include, or are supplemented by, loyalty tests. Indefinite in its
boundaries, the current insistence on loyalty gains some content by its identifi-
cation with the quality of not being a Communist. But experts tell us it is diffi-
cult to detect communism, and the search for its essence takes us off again in
many directions. Lawyers are likely to find the heart of communist disloyalty
not in the support of public housing or racial equality, but in the fostering of
revolution, allegedly on behalf of the oppressed masses, but actually, most of us
believe, in the interests of the Kremlin. Even with the virus thus isolated, there
remain troubling questions, of perhaps only philosophical importance, about the
sincerity of a revolutionary's belief, and about his possibly deep devotion to an
* The investigation and research for this article were made possible by a grant to Yale
University, in memory of Louis S. Weiss, by the Louis S. Weiss Fund, Inc. It is part of a
larger study, similarly supported, by the senior author, on loyalty and security programs
affecting employment.
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
Third-year student, Yale Law School.
1 All states, by statute, rule, or practice, require that the moral character of all applicants
for admission be approved prior to admission to the bar. See, e.g., Rules Governing Admission
to the Bar of Illinois, § I (adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois, 1937, amended, 1947,
1952). See also, Jackson, Character Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 20 Fordham L.
Rev. 305 (1951); Rules for Admission to the Bar (West Pub. Co., 1951).
All states require the applicant, upon acceptance for admission, to subscribe to an oath to
support the Constitution. Although these oaths vary in detail, many follow approximately a
form recommended by the American Bar Association. See, e.g., the Ohio Oath:
"I Do Solemnly Swear:
"I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State
of Ohio;
"I will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial offices;
"I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be
unjust, nor any defense except such as I belief to be honestly debatable under the law of the
land;
"I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided in me such means only
as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by
any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
"I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client, and will
accept no compensation in connection with his business except from him or with his knowledge
and approval;
"I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I
am charged;
"I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless
or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice, So Help Me God.'!
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America which he envisages with different eyes from the rest of us. But if we
confine our attention to the loyalty of lawyers, some of these uncertainties di-
minish. What the Association of American Law Schools recently observed about
teachers of law applies as much to the legal profession at large:
To say that a man is free to believe as he sees fit does not mean that his attitudes
toward his chosen profession are irrelevant to his qualifications for that profession. A
belief in lawful procedures may properly be demanded of one who undertakes to be a
teacher of law. Whatever ideals he may cherish, he must be willing to work for a
realization of them within the framework of orderly, lawful and democratic processes.
The teacher of law with no real belief in the principle of legality is a contradiction in
terms.2
Since constitutions are our fundamental source of legality, a willingness to sup-
port and defend our constitutional system (which includes procedures for its or-
derly alteration) would seem to be a prerequisite for a lawyer's faithful perform-
ance of his duties as a lawyer. A history of actual conduct in defiance of constitu-
tionally established positive law (e.g., against espionage, or perjury) might well
justify exclusion from the bar, even though the applicant had not been (or could
not be) convicted for the offenses. They could be said to go both to his moral
character and his support of the Constitution. Furthermore, even in the guarded
realm of belief as distinct from action, a lawyer's loyalty may be strictly meas-
ured. Thus, an ordinary citizen might believe with the utmost sincerity and de-
votion to his country that its welfare required abstention from violence under all
circumstances, even against invasion. Contrariwise, another might urge imme-
diate resort to violence to overthrow a government he believed to be corrupt.
Whether such beliefs are permissible for a lawyer has been questioned.
The case of the conscientious objector who would become a lawyer reached
the Supreme Court of the United States in In re Summers.' There the Illinois
Supreme Court, acting through one of its Committees on Character and Fitness,
denied Summers's application apparently on the sole ground that he was, on re-
ligious grounds, totally unwilling to resort to violence and thus unwilling to
serve in the armed forces. This stand, in the Illinois court's view, made it impos-
sible for him to take in good faith the oath to support the Constitution of Illi-
nois.4 Though it found that a justiciable controversy existed, the United States
Supreme Court found no state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment in
the denial of admission.
The urgent question of this decade, however, is not the loyalty of the consci-
entious objector, but of the prospective revolutionary, who, as we have said, is
usually identified with the communist movement. Central issues about the advo-
2 Proceedings of the Association of American Law Schools 61, 99 (1951).
3 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
4 But d. Application of Charles J. Steinbugler, 297 N.Y. 713, 77 N.E. 2d 16 (1947), where
the New York Court of Appeals held that a claim of exemption from military service upon
conscientious and lawful grounds, without proof of insincerity or disloyalty, was not evidence
bearing on an applicant's character or fitness for admission to the bar.
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cacy of violent overthrow of the government and about the inquiries that may
be made to discover it are raised by the more recent Illinois case of George A.5
There seems to be no indication whatever that George A. was in fact a Commu-
nist. He attracted the attention of the Committee by expounding, as one of the
principles of the Constitution, the "right of revolution'.' in Jeffersonian terms.
Then, when a panel and later the full Committee sought to inquire further into
his political beliefs to detect, one supposes, the degree of communist influence,
George A. refused on principle to answer questions about his political associa-
tions, reading habits, or anything else that would disclose any attitudes save
those he himself chose to expound to the Committee. He was denied admission,
and has not as yet filed a petition to have the denial judicially reviewed.8
These two cases are apt and important illustrations of the extent to which bar
examiners may choose to investigate questions of loyalty, and of the apparent
range of discretion which their mandate to determine "good moral character"
leaves them. The question is not, however, one to be approached primarily as a
matter of constitutional limitations. There are limitations, to be sure, which are
discussed below. More important are the actual practices of bar examiners,
courts, and legislatures. Those practices can be modified by the bodies that have
evolved them. Whatever the limits of their inquisitorial and exclusionary pow-
ers, they may find it advisable not to press to those limits. And examining bodies
whose procedures are still innocent of loyalty tests may, on considering the dif-
ficulties involved, decide to go on in the old-fashioned way.
The legislature, the courts, and the bar itself-each exercises some control
over admission.
The power of the legislature to regulate admission to the bar has evoked
varied degrees of judicial protest. In the name of "inherent powers," presuma-
bly founded on the relations of the Inns of Court to the law courts in Westmin-
ster, or of "separation of powers" and the independence of the judiciary, the
courts have occasionally rebuffed the intrusion of the legislature, especially
when it inclined to lower the barriers. The legislators, on their side, have sum-
moned the mighty engine of "police power"-the power to regulate callings and
professions in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. The result, gen-
erally, is a practical if not entirely logical compromise. The legislature may set
5 The abbreviated name is used to facilitate impersonal discussion rather than to disguise
identity. The individual concerned, George Anastaplo, a graduate of the Law School of the
University of Chicago, was denied admission to the Illinois Bar in June, 1951. He has privately
published a useful collection of excerpts from the proceedings, with his analysis and criticisms,
in Anastaplo, Some Rash Innovations and Speculations (1951). See also, London, Heresy and
the Illinois Bar: The Application of George Anastaplo for Admission, 12 Lawyers Guild
Review 163 (1952).
6 The Illinois Supreme Court has held that it will not reverse the denial of a certificate of
character and fitness in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the Com-
mittee. In ie Frank, 293 Ill. 263, 127 N.E. 640 (1920). See Sprecker, Admission to Practice
Law in Illinois, 46 Ill. L. Rev. 811 (1952).
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qualifications; the courts may add to them.7 In any case, no conflict has devel-
oped in the area with which we are concerned.
Whatever the source of power, it is exercised in every state by committees of
lawyers under some judicial supervision.8 The certification of good moral charac-
ter may, in some states, be delegated to district judges, but they in turn may
call on the local bar for assistance. In surveying the variety of requirements that
bear on loyalty, the source of the requirement will be mentioned whenever it
seems relevant. It makes little difference in immediate effect. However, the
strength of a rule as an expression of public policy is certainly greater when it is
promulgated by the legislature or the supreme court of a state than when it is
the practice of a committee or of individual members of a committee. And the
strength of a rule, as against legal attacks on its validity, is clearly enhanced
when it is the offspring of the very court asked to undo it, rather than of the
legislature or a committee of the bar.
OATHs AND AFIDAVITS OF LOYALTY
Only a few states have so far prescribed for lawyers a loyalty oath going be-
yond the traditional promise to uphold the state and national Constitutions. In
1952, the Kentucky Court of Appeals added the requirement for admission that
"Cno person who is a Communist or who advocates the overthrow of government
by force may become or remain a member of the Bar." Applicants for admission
in that state are now required to take an oath generally following the language
of the court's mandate.9
7 See generally on the role of court and legislature in governing admission to practice law,
Green, The Courts' Power Over Admission and Disbarment, 4 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1925); Power
of Legislature Respecting Admission to Bar, 144 A.L.R. 150 (1943).
8 Survey of the Legal Profession, Bar Examinations and Requirements for Admission to
the Bar 77 (1952).
9 Letter from R. Vincent Goodlatt, Esq., Secretary, State Board of Bar Examiners (Oct. 30,
1952). See also N.J. Stat. Ann. (1949) Tit. 41, §§ 1-3. The New Jersey legislature, in 1949,
passed this statute requiring an oath of all public officials and employees and all coun-
selors and attorneys at law. The oath confines itself to an abjuration of belief, advocacy, etc.,
of forcible or unlawful change in government, and of affiliation with organizations having such
aims. To these conventional loyalty oath terms is added a provision that echoes the verbiage
of another age: "... and that I am not bound by any allegiance to any foreign prince, poten-
tate, state or sovereignty whatever. So Help me God." Nominees of the Progressive party in
the general election of 1948 attacked the constitutionality of this statute and other related
statutes prescribing similar oaths for nominees for public office. In Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J.
578, 71 A. 2d 352 (1950), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that so much of the challenged
legislation as was applicable to the governor, members of the legislature, and candidates for
those offices was unconstitutional and void, since the legislature does not have the power to
vary the oaths prescribed in the state constitution for those offices. It did not mention the
validity of the provision relating to lawyers. However, since the Imbrie decision, the supreme
court has not administered the statutory oath to incoming lawyers. Letter from John Gildea,
Esq., Deputy Clerk, Supreme Court of New Jersey (Dec. 19, 1952). But cf. Thorp v. Board
of Trustees, 6 N.J. 498, 79 A. 2d 462 (1951), holding an identical oath constitutional when ap-
plied to teachers.
See also questions in the Michigan, New York, Rhode Island, and Illinois applicants'
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Alaska's oath can claim the distinction of antedating the current preoccupa-
tion with loyalty. In 1941, its legislature set up a formidable barrier against sub-
versive penetration that deserves to be reproduced in full:
Every applicant shall state under oath that he is a citizen of the United
States. If a citizen by birth he shall state his birthplace and date of birth; if a citizen
by naturalization, the time, place and court in which he or his ancestor made his
declaration of intention and petition for admission to citizenship, and that he has,
neither by word nor deed, committed any act in any foreign country inconsistent with
United States citizenship or his allegiance thereto; that he is not, and has not been a
member of any organization, association, society, or group that advises, advocates, or
teaches opposition to all organized government; that he does not believe in, advise,
advocate or teach, is not, and has not been a member of or affiliated with any organiza-
tion, association, society or group that believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all forms
of law, and that he does not believe in or practice sabotage; that he has not at any
time or place been convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or of a
felony, or been disbarred or suspended. 10
By virtue of a slip of punctuation, most of this statute could be read as applying
only to naturalized citizens; but this was probably not the legislative intent, and
the statute is not so interpreted by the bar examiners of Alaska. As for the effect
under the statute of past behavior, we are advised that a majority of the exam-
iners "have stated that they would interpret the Act to mean, for example, that
one who was once a member of the Communist party but later resigned and
presently disclaims any belief in or association with the party's doctrine would
be ineligible for membership in the Alaska Bar.""
Three other states have set oaths for applicants that require an unqualified
denial of past subversion. In two of them the initiative came entirely from the
judiciary or the bar, though there is no reason to believe that the legislature re-
garded the action with any disfavor. The applicant's affidavit in Colorado con-
tains the following:
The above-named applicant... states and represents.... That I am a native boml
naturalizedJ
citizen of the United States of America; that I believe in its form of government and
have never been disloyal thereto; and that I am not at this time, nor have I ever been,
a member of any association, society or group which has for its object, or teaches or
advocates the alteration of the form of government of the United States by force, or
questionnaires which, though set out as inquiries, have some resemblance to test oaths. The
question on the Michigan, New York (1st and 2d Dep'ts), and Rhode Island forms asks:
"Can you conscientiously and do you affirm that you are, without mental reservation, loyal
to the Government of the United States?" Illinois question 20 reads, "Do you now without
any mental reservation and will you hereafter loyally support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Illinois?"
10 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) § 35-2-42.
1 Letter from J. Gerald Williams, Esq., Attorney General of Alaska (Nov. 7, 1952).
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which has been declared a subversive group by the Department of Justice of the
United States.12
That the declaration is intended to be made without any reservations is indi-
cated by the wording of many other paragraphs of the application, which uni-
formly add "except as follows" (e.g., "I have never been discharged from any
employment, except as follows"). In Washington, the state bar recommended to
the supreme court that a specific disavowal of Communist party membership be
included in the admission oath. The court modified the suggestion and added to
the oath this provision: "I am not now and never have been a member of any
organization having as its purpose and object the overthrow of the United
States government by force or violence."'"
Finally, when the Oklahoma legislature demanded of all public employees an
"Oath of Allegiance" of remarkable scope as to past, present, and future subver-
sion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court promptly adopted it as a supplement to the
admission oath for lawyers and found it free of all constitutional infirmities.14 In
Question 2, Application for Admission to the Bar of Colorado (Form No. 2).
"3 Clause 2, Oath of Attorney, State of Washington. For an account of the background of
this provision, see Washington Supreme Court Adopts Canons of Professional and Judicial
Ethics and Non-Communist Admission Oath, 34 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 173 (1951); Report of Com-
mittee on Legal Education of Washington State Bar Association, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 367 (1950).
"4 Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 237 P. 2d 131 (1951). The text of the oath
is:
I, - , do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma against all enemies, foreign
and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma; that I take this obligation freely, with-
out any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully dis-
charge the duties upon which I am about to enter. •
"And I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member of any party
or organization, political or otherwise, that now advocates the overthrow of the Government
of the United States or of the State of Oklahoma by force or violence or other unlawful means;
That I am not affiliated directly or indirectly with the Communist Party, the Third Com-
munist International, with any foreign political agency, party, organization or Government,
or with any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been
officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized agency of the
United States to be a communist front or subversive Organization, nor do I advocate revolu-
tion, teach or justify a program of sabotage, force or violence, sedition or treason, against the
Government of the United States or of this State, nor do I advocate directly or indirectly,
teach or justify by any means whatsoever, the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of this State, or change in the form of Government thereof, by force or any unlawful
means; that I will take up arms in the defense of the United States in time of War, or National
emergency, if necessary; that within the five (5) years immediately preceding the taking of this
oath (or affirmation) I have not been a member of The Communist Party, The Third Com-
munist International, or of any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever
which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized
public agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization, or
of any party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocated the overthrow of the Gov-
ernment of the United States or of the State of Oklahoma by force or violence or other unlaw-
ful means;
"And I do further swear (or affirm) that during such time as I am... [name of office or
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Wieman v. Updegraff,5 however, the Supreme Court of the United States found
this oath, it seems fair to say, just a little bit unconstitutional.
Its infirmity lay in an interpretation by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
which made it impossible for an employee to show that his membership in a sub-
versive organization had been an innocent one. The Court, through Mr. justice
Clark, pointed out that in each of three loyalty test cases already decided it had
insisted that knowledge of the unlawful purposes of an organization was essen-
tial."6 To bar a candidate for office or a civil servant or a teacher because of an
affiliation maintained in reasonable ignorance of its import would be a denial of
due process. This was the case with the Oklahoma oath, so the Oklahoma courts
were reversed without any disposition of other interesting problems that had
been raised.
One of these was clearly the validity of the five-year retrospective ban on sub-
versive membership. It will be recalled that the significance for public employ-
ment of past membership in suspect organizations had already been before the
Court in Garner v. Board of Public Works.17 There the Court held that an oath for
municipal employees requiring them to disclaim membership in subversive or-
ganizations during a preceding five-year period was neither a bill of attainder
nor an ex post facto law, especially since five years had already elapsed between
the prohibition of employment to members of such organizations and the re-
quirement of the oath. These special facts would not yet apply to the oaths here
under review. Since the Court divided closely on the validity of the oath in the
Garner case because of its retrospective features, one may seriously question
both the five-year provision of the Oklahoma oath and the "never have been"
language of the others.
Are they not ex post facto laws? To put a simple case, certainly a person who
joined the Communist Political Association during World War II when Russia
was our ally and Earl Browder had undertaken to shake hands with J. P. Mor-
gan 8 had no expectation that he was doing an act which would later disqualify
him from becoming a lawyer (or a public employee or teacher). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in a generally unilluminating opinion, missed the distinction be-
tween the five-year provision in its oath, which sprang full-blown from the legis-
lature in 1951, and that of the oath in the Garner case, which was authorized in
1941, but not put into effect until 1948. It further asserted that separation from
a state college staff was not the sort of "punishment" that an ex post facto law
Can employee'] I will not advocate and that I will not become a member of any party or
organization, political or otherwise, that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the
United States or of the State of Oklahoma by force or violence or other unlawful means."
16 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
16Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
7 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
Is Schlesinger, The Vital Center 110 (1949).
[Vol 20
HeinOnline -- 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.  486 1952-1953
LOYALTY TESTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
is struck down for imposing. 19 To be sure, the United States Supreme Court by-
passed this issue in the Garner case, but if there is any vitality at all left to the
once-great cases of Cummings v. Missouri ° and .Ex Parte Garland,2 it must re-
side in their holding that "punishment" in the ex post facto context includes
deprivation of the opportunity to practice a profession. Cummings, it will be re-
membered, was a priest; Garland, a lawyer. The Court in the Garland case recog-
nized a distinction between setting qualifications and inflicting punishment."
There is room for argument whether freedom from some of the affiliations and
conduct proscribed may not constitute reasonable qualifications for admission.
But the absence from these oaths of any opportunity for repentance or explana-
tion seems to fit them into the pattern condemned in the Garland case. It is their
unequivocal character that distinguishes them from a variety of other demands
(to be discussed below) for sworn information about the same sorts of affilia-
tions..
It is safe to say, then, that all the lawyers' oaths now in operation or in pros-
pect are contrary to due process unless they are construed to include a require-
ment of knowing participation in subversive movements. All of them, one may
further venture, are ex post facto laws and invalid to the extent that their terms
flatly exclude candidates on account of lawful conduct occurring before the pro-
mulgation of the oath. But an oath like Oklahoma's is, as has been suggested,
only a little bit unconstitutional at this moment in history. One word-"know-
ingly"--meets the due process argument; and the passage of time will blunt the
ex post facto objection.
Even in unconstitutional form these oaths are indicative of the kinds of bar-
riers to admission some authorities want to raise. If these particular barriers are
not wholly effective as a result of lingering constitutional limitations, cannot
others, equally formidable, be constructed out of the unquarried depths of "good
moral character"? Though remote membership in a subversive organization may
not automatically disqualify, perhaps it may be reviewed in judging the appli-
cant's character and fitness; and if such matters are open to consideration at all,
the applicant may be required to disclose them to the examiners.
INQUIRIES TO CANDIDATES BEARING ON LOYALTY
Before surveying the kinds of questions that are put to applicants, it may be
desirable to describe the sources of information used in this discussion, with
more prominence than the obscurity of a footnote. There are two useful com-
pendia on bar admission practices, one a substantial pamphlet summarizing,
from official sources, the requirements for each state,23 the other a recently pub-
19 Board of Regents of Oklahoma Agricultural Colleges v. Updegraff, 237 P. 2d 131, 138
(Okla., 1951).
20 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277 (1867).
214 Wall. (U.S.) 333 (1867).
2 Ibid., at 379.
23 Rules for Admission to the Bar (West Pub. Co., 1951).
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lished monograph in the Survey of the Legal Profession. 4 Neither contains any
detailed information on political tests, which is not surprising in view of the rel-
ative novelty of such tests and, as will appear, the sporadic character of their
administration. We consequently circularized the bar examiners of all the states,
the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii, asking if they had any settled
mandate or policy about the effect of "past or present subversive beliefs or acts"
on admissibility, what weight they attached to such beliefs or acts "as bearing
on character and fitness," whether they had formulated standards to guide
them in this field, and what sort of inquiries they made. Replies were received
from all but five of the jurisdictions addressed,u most of them quite helpful. In
some states the determination of character is left very largely to county com-
mittees. A few of these were also queried in populous areas,26 and where it ap-
peared that there might be significant variation within a state.
Between a third and a half of the states require an interview with a character
committee as a routine part of the admissions process; others may summon the
candidate if his papers suggest that an interview is desirable.27 As the result of
rumors of close questioning by some committees, it was decided to direct a ques-
tionnaire to a group of recent law school graduates, inquiring about their ex-
periences. The questionnaire was constructed on the basis of a few first-hand re-
ports, and requested the respondent to say whether he had been asked any of a
range of questions, beginning with one about membership in the Communist
party and ending with a variety of recent political issues, e.g., the President's
seizure of the steel mills and the Marshall Plan, opinions on which might be
elicited to establish conformity either with a communist line or with an exam-
iner's line. Most of the putative questions, however, dealt with familiar indices
of subversiveness, such as the Attorney General's list of subversive organiza-
tions and association with Communists.
The questionnaires were sent to the last three graduating classes (1950, 1951,
and 1952) of the Yale and University of Chicago Law Schools, who were selected
because they could be easily reached, because it was hoped they would have
above-average motivation to take the trouble to reply, because they were ex-
pected to produce a good geographical dispersion, and because they (more than
older groups) would have been exposed to loyalty tests. All these assumptions
24 Survey of the Legal Profession, Bar Examinations and Requirements for Admission to
the Bar (1952).
25 Arizona, Hawaii, North Carolina, Oregon, and Virginia.
26 Connecticut, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. In New York State the admitting
units are the four appellate departments each of which has its own character committee. In
Illinois, the Supreme Court appoints a character committee for each appellate district.
2 7 Survey of the Legal Profession, op. cit. supra note 24, at 257 suggests that more than half
the states require an interview. Our survey, on the other hand, disclosed such a requirement
by only a few more than one third of the states.
[Val. 20
HeinOnline -- 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.  488 1952-1953
LOYALTY TESTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR
were justified, as the tabulation in the note below shows.28 The weakness of the
questionnaire lay in the assumption that any recurring pattern of oral interro-
gation would emerge. None did (except within some committees), and no statis-
tical tabulation of the results is feasible. What we did get from many coopera-
tive respondents was a wealth of information about all loyalty aspects of admis-
sions procedure, supplementing that supplied by the examiners.
Bar examiners, it appears, have had little specific guidance from the courts or
legislatures in this field. Where there is a valid loyalty oath, they may, of course,
undertake to exclude those who cannot honestly subscribe to it. And where a
state has embarked upon an ambitious program of "communist control," the
examiners may feel that it evidences a general public policy which they should
try to carry out. We have no express communications to this effect, however,
and it may, with plausibility, be argued that if the legislature harries Commu-
nists in six different ways but says nothing about admitting communist lawyers,
it has no policy on that score. Such a doubt is raised, for example, about the laws
of Michigan, which have, in the last few years, piled up a veritable code of anti-
communist measures.2 9 At its 1951 meeting, the Michigan Bar Association rec-
ommended passage of a statute giving the Association access to information
about subversives in the hands of the state police in aid of disbarment proceed-
ings, and a change in the canons of ethics to make advocacy of violent over-
throw a ground for disbarment. The Michigan Supreme Court amended the
28 Response to questionnaires:
Yale Chicago
Number Sent ....................... 502
Returned Undelivered ............... 7
Net Group Reached ................. 495
Replies ............................ 320
% Replies ......................... 64.6%
Distribution of Replies:
California ............ 16 Massachusetts ....... 7
Colorado ............ 6 Michigan ............ 3
Connecticut .......... 41 Minnesota ........... 5
Florida .............. 3 M issouri ............ 5
Hawaii .............. 4 New Jersey .......... 7
Illinois .............. 63 New York ........... 105
Iowa ................ 4 Ohio ................ 9














Dist. of Col ..........
One or two replies from: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, West Virginia, Wyoming.
No replies from: Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia.
29 See Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp., 1951) §§ 28.236, 28.243(1) to (5), 28.813(1) to (4), 27.3178
(71a); Mich. Const. Art. II, § 22.
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canon, but the legislation died in committee.Y' The situation is similar in Massa-
chusetts. 31 In neither of those great states (on the basis of limited information)
did the examiners in recent years make any out-of-the-ordinary efforts to dis-
cover subversives.u
The argument that if the legislature has set out to annihilate communism, it
will come to lawyers in its own good time, gains support from the Maryland ex-
perience. Maryland's famous Ober Act, passed in 1949, created the category of
"subversive person," who is barred from holding office, etc. An act of the Gener-
al Assembly in 1952 now requires the Court of Appeals to find that an appli-
cant for admission to the bar is "not a subversive person, as defined by the Sub-
versive Activities Act of 1949."1 3
This is one of two legislative loyalty standards for lawyers, aside from oaths,
that have come to our attention. The other is California's Business and Profes-
sional Code, amended in 1951 to provide that "no person who advocates over-
throw of the Government of the United States or of this State by force, violence,
or other unconstitutional means shall be certified" for a license to practice; if al-
ready licensed, this is a ground for disbarment.34 Two states have rules of court
laying down general loyalty standards. Kentucky's has already been men-
tioned: "No person who is a Communist or who advocates the overthrow of gov-
ernment by force may become or remain a member of the bar of the State of
Kentucky."3 New York's has been in existence since 1921. In its current form it
requires the applicant to "furnish satisfactory proof to the effect: (1) That he
believes in the form of government of the United States and is loyal to such gov-
ernment. . . ."I' It is this rule that is the basis for the following question in the
New York applicant's questionnaire:
(A) Do you believe in the principles underlying the form of government of the United
States?
30Stason, Disciplining Subversive Members of the Bar, 30 Mich. S.BJ. No. 12, at 16
(1951); Canon 32 Amended, 31 ibid. No. 4, at 31 (1952).
31 See Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp., 1951) §§ 264-16 to 264-23, 50-1.
32 The seven recent applicants' questionnaires from Massachusetts and the three from
Michigan disclosed no loyalty questioning by the interviewers. But see note 9 supra for a
loyalty question in a Michigan form. The State Board of Bar Examiners in Michigan recently
decided, for the first time, to summon an applicant for oral examination on loyalty grounds.
Letter from Stanley E. Beattie, Esq. (Jan. 7, 1953). He was cleared. Ibid. (Jan. 22, 1953).
31 Md. Acts (1952) c. 27, p. 243. The Ober Act, Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws, Art. 85A, de-
fines "subversive person" as follows: "'Subversive person' means any person who commits,
attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets, advises or teaches by any
means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended
to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the
constitutional form of the Government of the United States, or of the State of Maryland, or
any political sub-division of either of them, by revolution, force, or violence; or who is a mem-
ber of a subversive organization or a foreign subversive organization."
34 Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code (Deering, Supp., 1951) §§ 6064.1, 6106.1.
35 Goodlatt, op. cit. supra note 9.
36 N.Y. Rules of Civil Practice (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp., 1952) § 1.
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(B) Can you conscientiously and do you affirm that you are, without any mental
reservation, loyal to the Government of United States?3 7
Perhaps one-third of the states have what may be called direct loyalty questions
in their application forms; the phrasing of many of them suggests that a wrong
answer would have serious consequences, but they fall a little short of setting
positive standards. For example, Alabama asks:
(a) Do you believe in the form of, and are you loyal to, the Government of the United
States?
(b) Are you a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, or have
you ever been?
(c) Do you believe in, are you a member of, do you support, any organization that
believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force
or by illegal or unconstitutional methods? Or have you ever belived (sic) in, be-
longed to or supported any such organization?8
Others follow either the New York pattern of a general question about loyalty,
or the up-to-date formula exemplified by Alabama, or some combination of the
two.
39
The most remarkable question encountered is reported from Hawaii by an
applicant. 40 After having answered "yes" or "no" to every organization on the
Attorney General's list, plus several direct questions designed to avoid any pos-
sible escape for the guileful Communist (e.g. "Are you now, or have you ever
been, a member of any organization or committee the name of which included
the word 'Communist?' "), the applicant is finally confronted with this attempt
to close the last loophole:
If you were to be listed as a "Communist" in the records of any federal investigative
agency, what past actions or organizational affiliations of yours not already listed
37 Question 23, Applicants' Questionnaire, First Dep't, State of New York. Similar ques-
tions appear as numbers 31 and 34 of the Second Dep't Questionnaire. The questionnaires of
the other two New York departments were not available to us.
38 Question 15, Application for Admission to Bar Examination, State of Alabama.
39 Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island have ques-
tions similar to those in the New York questionnaire.
Question 10(d) on the Indiana application reads: "Have you ever been a member of or
affiliated with an organization which advocates the overthrow of the government of the United
States by force and violence or have you ever been a member of or affiliated with an organiza-
tion which is on the subversive list of the Attorney General of the United States?"
The North Dakota questionnaire asks: "Are you now or have you ever been a member of
the Communist Party or any organization seeking the overthrow of our Government?"
The applicant's questionnaire of the Houston (Texas) Bar Association includes the fol-
lowing questions: "Do you belong to or advocate the principles of the Communist Party?
Have you ever belonged to, or attended the meetings of that organization or any other group
which individually, or as members, advocate the ultimate overthrow of the Government of the
United States of America, by force? Do you belong to or have you attended the meetings of
any group which advocates any theory or 'Ism' which would prevent you from taking the
following oath wholeheartedly?: 'I do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of
the United States, and of this State; that I will honestly demean myself in the practice of
the law, and will discharge my duties to my clients to the best of my ability. So help me God.'
0 No reply was received from our inquiries to the Hawaiian examining board.
19531
HeinOnline -- 20 U. Chi. L. Rev.  491 1952-1953
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
byyou might be used by such investigative agency to support its conclusion? In
answering this question, assume that all of your past actions and organizational affilia-
tions are known to such investigative agency.
Other questions frequently encountered may be considered as an indirect way
of eliciting information bearing on loyalty. Probably every state requires the ap-
plicant to disclose any arrests or convictions. A truthful reply would expose the
rare applicant who had been involved in criminally subversive behavior. In a
quite different setting, both New York and Illinois ask the applicant to write a
short essay on basic constitutional principles; it was the answer to this question,
the reader will recall, that may have led to George A.'s undoing. Some states re-
quire a listing of every organization the applicant has ever belonged to. This
may be intended (or coupled with a direct question so intended) to gauge the
applicant's public-spiritedness; it is also a way of getting information about af-
filiations that the examiners may find suspect.
New York has a question that hovers on the borderline of indirection. In the
form used in the First Department, it reads:
Are you a member of any party or organization the object or purpose of which is to
effect, directly or indirectly, changes in the form of government provided for by the
United States Constitution? ... If so, state the facts on a rider.41
If this question refers to changes by means other than those provided for in the
Constitution, then it is an ambiguous way of asking the applicant if he is associ-
ated with a group seeking unlawful change. But if it should be read to include
"as the Constitution is currently written and expounded," then, of course, it takes
in any group advocating constitutional change, from the (women's) equal rights
amendment to the denunciation of executive agreements in lieu of treaties re-
cently espoused by the American Bar Association. 42 Perhaps the question is in-
tended as an exercise in interpretation for the neophyte lawyer, who has already,
in the same document, been asked to list all his memberships, past or present, in
clubs, associations, etc.
The examiners, of course, are not confined to information received from the
applicant himself. Character references are a universal and central part
of the admission process and, in Indiana and probably elsewhere, the ques-
tionnaires sent to references include specific loyalty inquiries. A considerable
number of examining boards make some kind of independent investigation of
every applicant on character grounds, including loyalty. The extent and tech-
nique of these investigations are not much publicized. In some cases, state or
local police are used; in others, private investigating agencies. 43 In a special
4Question 22, Applicants' Questionnaire, First Dep't, State of New York. The Second
Dep't questionnaire includes substantially the same question. The questionnaires from the
Third and Fourth Dep'ts were not available to us for comparison.
4See Proceedings of the House of Delegates: 1952 Annual Meeting, 38 A.B.A.J. 1018,
1069 (1952).
43 E.g., the New Mexico board employs a private investigating service to investigate appli-
cants.
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category is the National Conference of Bar Examiners. It maintains an elabo-
rate and efficient character investigating service which is used by most bar ex-
aminers for all applicants who are already attorneys and by a few states for stu-
dent applicants not long resident in the state.44 The National Conference sup-
plies the examiners with whatever obtainable information the examiners want,
and presumably this would include loyalty information of the sorts already de-
scribed.
A number of examiners reported that they would make an independent ex-
amination if something questionable appeared from other sources; doubtless any
board would if it seemed necessary.
When, from whatever source, something turns up that raises a question about
fitness, an interview with the candidate is the logical next step. In many-per-
haps most-states interviews are not customary in unchallenged cases.45 In
those that do schedule an interview for every applicant, whether with one or
more members of the bar examining board or of a separate character committee,
the interviews are often perfunctory and ordinarily do not even approach topics
bearing on loyalty. 4
So far as our inquiries disclose, oral questions bearing on loyalty have been
recently put to applicants in the following jurisdictions: California, Connecticut
(New Haven County), District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania (Philadelphia County). It
should be emphasized that the reports from some states number only one or two,
and may, in some instances, have reflected a misunderstanding of our question-
naire to recent graduates, in that the respondent in making an affirmative reply
may have had in mind written inquiries instead of interviews. Thus, against two
replies from New Jersey reporting some questioning about communism, there
should be set a statement from a member of several years' standing of the Char-
acter Committee for Essex County (New Jersey's most populous county):
In all of my experience on the Commitee, I have never heard any questions ad-
dressed to the applicant which bore on political issues and I have never heard of any
other section of our Committee questioning an applicant along those lines. We have
never denied approval to an applicant on grounds of disloyalty or subversion and I
cannot recall having heard about, or read about anything of this sort in any other
County in New Jersey. 47
44 Survey of the Legal Profession, op. cit. supra note 8, at 262, 472 et seq.
15 See note 27 supra.
46Some typical replies received from recent applicants were:
"The only question asked was my law school and my undergraduate college."
"I was asked no questions except my name and where I planned to practice."
"My father is a member of the local bar. The examination was pro forma, perfunctory, and
designed to elicit no information."
"The interview consisted principally of reminiscing about law school days."
"No political questions. Committee spent its time doubting ability of women to be lawyers."
[Female applicant.]
"The local bar committee sticks solely to questions of legal ethics."
47 Letter from Ward J. Herbert, Esq. (Oct. 24, 1952).
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After making due allowance for such reservations, it seems to be the fairly
common, but by no means universal, practice to question applicants about loy-
alty matters in a routine interview in the following jurisdictions: Connecticut
(New Haven County), District of Columbia, Illinois (Chicago), and New York
(Second Department). Though we had substantial numbers of questionnaires
from candidates in each of these jurisdictions, it is not possible to infer with any
accuracy why some were questioned and others were not. Of fifty-four Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School graduates admitted in Chicago, the division appeared
to be exactly even. One probable explanation for inconsistency is that the com-
mittees do not usually sit en banc. An applicant may be questioned by a panel or
by a single member. It is likely that there are committee members who discuss
anything but communism, and it appears that there are some who discuss little
else.
The standard questions are what one would expect: Are you a Communist?
Do you believe in the overthrow of the government by force? Are you a member
of any organization advocating such overthrow? Usually this is as far as it goes.
Some diffidence on the part of questioners is reflected by reported questions like
these: "You don't belong to any of those 'ism' organizations, do you?" "You
aren't a Communist or anything are you?" Such sketchy patterns as develop
emerge from topical matters or, one suspects, from the interests of the particular
examiner. Thus, in 1952, a number of respondents were asked about the sup-
posedly "pinkish" or "leftish" character of Americans for Democratic Action.
Another group of responses describe a recurring colloquy that might be em-
ployed by a whole committee, but sounds more like a highly personal manifes-
tation. As reconstructed from several versions, it goes something like this: "Who
was Karl Marx?" "Have you ever read his 'Capital' outside of school?" "Have
you ever read the one he wrote with Engels?" The italicized phrase is presuma-
bly the key, but to what? A respondent, reporting rumors about this line of
questioning, had heard of one extracurricular reader of Marx who was commend-
ed for acquainting himself with the communist menace, and of another who was
critically and searchingly questioned for his sympathies, if any, with the hereti-
cal works. If there is a single favorite test question, it is probably this: "Do you
think that Communists are eligible to practice law?" In one jurisdiction it is re-
ported that the "wrong" answer to this question will lead to protracted scrutiny
of the applicant's record.
If bar examiners on the basis of "wrong" answers or other data decide not to
recommend a candidate for admission, judicial review is usually available; but
it is weighted against the applicant by a presumption in favor of the sound exer-
cise of discretion by the examiners and by placing on the applicant the burden of
proof to establish his character and fitness.48 There is little likelihood that the
48 See, generally, Booker, The "Right" to Practice Law, I Duke B.J. 249, 250 (1951);
Power of Legislature Respecting Admission to Bar, 144 A.L.R. 150 (1943); Good Moral Char-
acter of Applicant as Requisite for Admission to Bar, 72 A.L.R. 929 (1931), 28 A.L.R. 1140
(1924). Some states provide by statute for court review of the action of character and admission
committees. See, e.g., Calif. Bus. and Prof. Code Ann. (Deering, 1951) § 6066.
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scope of questioning will be confined, unless it invades some legally protected
privilege. In a New York case that seems to have been arranged for the purpose
of indicating in a rather bizarre way the permissible range of questioning, the
petitioner refused to tell the character committee "who discovered America?"
The Appellate Division upheld him, saying that all matters of "learning and
ability" were outside the jurisdiction of the character committee.
In the opinion of the court it is the duty of the Committee on Character and Fitness
to certify to this court an applicant for admission who has been certified by the State
Board of Law Examiners that he has passed the examination and if the candidate
satisfies the committee as to his moral character and general fitness and that he be-
lieves in the form of, and is loyal to, the government of the United States. This court
does not propose to define the limitations of questions which may be propounded to a
candidate in these respects.49
No American cases have been reported in the current era that would indi-
cate what courts will find meets the burden of proof of good moral character,
as against a finding by the committee of "disloyalty," "belief in the violent over-
throw of the government," "inability to subscribe honestly to the attorney's
oath to support the constitution," or any other formula that may be devised to
express forbidden degrees of subversiveness. 49 To the extent that disbarment
and denial of admission are analogous (conduct supporting disbarment will cer-
tainly support a denial), we have the record of a variety of disbarment cases
during and after World War I. Some of them were on technically sound grounds,
in that the lawyers had been convicted of violation of the Espionage Act. 0
Others mirror vividly the pro-war and later the anticommunist passions of the
era. There were disbarments for sympathetically addressing the I.W.W.,1 for
advocating anarchism and obstructing the draft," for helping aliens avoid mili-
tary service by assisting them in withdrawing applications for citizenship, 3 and
11 Application of Brennan, 230 App. Div. 218, 228, 243 N.Y. Supp. 705, 715 (1930).
49
a But see MNartin v. The Law Society [1950] 3 D.L.R. 173, where the Court of Appeals of
British Columbia upheld the Benchers of the Law Society of that province in their refusal to
admit an avowed Communist to the practice of law. The Benchers concluded that a Com-
munist cannot conscientiously take an oath which "binds him to disclose and make known to
His Majesty all treasons and traitorous conspiracies against him and not to 'seek to destroy
any man's property,"' and that the applicant had not satisfied them that he was a person of
good repute within the meaning and intent of the Legal Professions Act. It is noteworthy that
Canada does not have legislation comparable to the Smith Act. This decision is noted with
approval in Meredith, Communism and the British Columbia Bar, 28 Canadian B. Rev. 893
(1950); Law Practitioners: Refusal of Admission to a Communist, 27 New Zealand L. J. 17
(1951); Membership in or Affiliation with the Communist Party as Grounds for Disbarment,
26 Notre Dame Lawyer 498 (1951).
-50 See, e.g., In re Kerl, 32 Idaho 737, 188 Pac. 40 (1920); In re O'Connell, 184 Cal. 584,
194 Pac. 1010 (1920); In re Wells, 121 Wash. 68, 208 Pac. 25 (1922). But see Chafee,
Free Speech in the United States 38 et seq. (1948), on abuse of the Espionage Act.
'I In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925).
9 In re Margolis, 269 Pa. 206, 112 Atl. 478 (1921).
"In re Arctander, 110 Wash. 296, 188 Pac. 380 (1920).
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for advising men not to register for selective service.54 As we approach or exceed
the temper of the early 1920's, such cases become pertinent again.55
World War II produced one exclusion and one disbarment case, neither a
firm basis for generalization. In Application of Cassidy,"5 the New York Appel-
late Division rejected the application of a candidate who, it found from "undis-
puted documentary evidence," believed "in the resort to force to overthrow the
existing form of government of the United States"-not as a Communist but as
a follower of Father Coughlin and the Christian Front. The applicant had been
acquitted, the court recognized, "by a jury after trial in the Federal court upon
an indictment charging him with conspiracy to overthrow the government of the
United States." But the jury did not have the benefit of the documents, and in
any case noncriminal conduct may evidence lack of "character and general fit-
ness requisite for an attorney."57 The decision is noteworthy because the court
reversed a recommendation of a majority (5-2) of the character committee for
admission. The disbarment case concerned an attorney who was involved in iso-
lationist propaganda early in World War II under such auspices that he was
tried and convicted for failure to register as a foreign agent. The court held that
the Foreign Agents Registration Act was "political in character" and that a vio-
lation of it did not involve moral turpitude.55 As for the further charge that his
propagandistic activities constituted misconduct, the views of the judges were
most pointedly expressed in a concurring opinion:
It must be at all times remembered that the right of free speech is a guarantee em-
bodied in the Constitution of the United States. And while this writer vigorously
dissents from some of Mr. Burch's political views and activities as revealed by the
record, nevertheless his right to express his views must be respected by the courts
so long as his activities do not contravene the laws of the state and nation. This
record does not reveal any such contravention. 9
The tone of the opinions and the outcome in this case are in marked contrast
to the World War I cases, and may be said to be characteristic of a spirit which
survived World War II, but not the cold war. 0
541n re Hofstede, 31 Idaho 448, 173 Pac. 1087 (1918). See also In re Wiltsie, 109 Wash.
261, 186 Pac. 848 (1920) (disbarred for soliciting employment to seek exemptions from Selec-
tive Service and for encouraging false affidavits). But cf. In re Clifton, 33 Idaho 614, 196 Pac.
670 (1921) (disloyal statements made by attorney not ground for disbarment); Lotto v. State,
208 S.W. 563 (Tex. Civ. App., 1919) (statement that "Germany is going to win the war and
I hope she will," referring to war between U.S. and Germany, held not conduct warranting
disbarment under Texas statute).
55 See, generally, O'Brian, New Encroachments on Individual Freedom, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1(1952).
56 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N.Y.S. 2d 202, aff'd, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E. 2d 41 (1947).
57 268 App. Div. at 287, citing Judiciary Act § 88(1).
58 In re Burch, 73 Ohio App. 97, 54 N.E. 2d 803 (1943).
59 54 N.E. 2d, at 808.
60 See Chafee, Thirty-Five Years with Freedom of Speech (1952).
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EFFECTS
We have now reviewed the factual material available on the rise of loyalty
tests for admission to the bar, and have come up with a handful of oaths, many
requests for written information, some half-concealed supplementary investiga-
tive techniques, and a few character committees with inquisitorial tendencies.
How many denials of admission have there been? Most bar examiners either
stated or implied that they had had none. This is certainly the case in Califor-
nia.6 About New York we have only rumors. In Illinois, there was George A.
In Washington, we understand that two attorney applicants, but no student ap-
plicants, have been denied admission.62 Florida, we are advised, has had "some"
rejections.63 There may, of course, be others. It is relevant to note that denials
on any character grounds, in the case of student applicants, are extremely infre-
quent. Estimates from New York, Illinois, and California indicate that they run
to less than one-half of one percent. In the First Appellate Court District of Illi-
nois, "in the ten years 1938-1948 only 8 out of a total of 3,805 applicants were re-
jected on the recommendation of the Committee on Character and Fitness."6 4
It is also relevant, for the sake of perspective, to record that at least seventeen
states apparently make no loyalty investigation and have no loyalty tests at all,
except the traditional oath to uphold the constitution. They are Arizona, Geor-
gia, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebras-
ka, Nevada, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. To these may be added Connecticut, except New
Haven County.
OBSERVATIONS AND RESERVATIONS
There seems to be no ready basis for unvarying distinction between those
states that assume their applicants are not Communists and those that have
61 Letter from Goscoe 0. Farley, Esq., Secretary, Committee of Bar Examiners (Nov. 12,
1952).
62 A student questionnaire. See also note 93 infra.
63 Letter from Olin E. Watts, Esq., Chairman, Board of Law Examiners (Oct. 31, 1952).
Professor Curtis Wright, Jr. has helpfully lent us a number of newspaper clippings on the
curious North Carolina case of Myron Ross. Ross, a veteran, a former union organizer and
Progressive party candidate for Congress in 1948, graduated from the University of North
Carolina Law School at the age of 33 with an admirable academic record. On August 4, 1952,
the day before the bar examinations, he was summoned before the Board of Law Examiners
without notice or charge, and, after a long interrogation, was excluded from the examination.
Ross made no issue of this until, about August 13, the Winston-Salem Journal (owned by
Gordon Gray, President of the University) charged that Ross "had a long record of Communist
underground activities in North Carolina." This Ross denied and told reporters that his
questioning had been almost entirely directed at his union activities. The Board chairman
said that neither Ross's union nor his Progressive party activities had influenced him, but
cast no further light on the Board's action. Indignant editorial comment on the Board's pro-
cedures was led by the Raleigh News-Observer, which declared (August 14, 1952) that they
were "more reminiscent of practices under totalitarianism Communism than of liberty under
law in the United States."
64 Survey of the Legal Profession, op. cit. supra note 8, at 255. See also Sprecker, op. cit.
supra note 6.
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erected the varieties'of screening devices we have described. Generally speaking,
the roll of do-nothing states consists largely of the less populous ones, where ap-
plicants are likely, as some of their examiners pointed out, to be personally
known to the committee, and where there are no urban centers of communist
activity. In two or three states, which we are not free to identify, there is no
loyalty investigation in the rural areas, but the examiners in the metropolis feel
obliged to make one. This rough separation between the wicked city and the vir-
tuous country is expectable but not universal. Thus both the Alabama and Mis-
sissippi examiners advised us with understandable pride that their citizens were
quite free of communist tendencies. The Mississippi examiners have never in-
vestigated an applicant for his subversive tendencies or activities because "we
have never entertained any suspicion on the part of any of them"; 61 but the
Alabama board, concededly out of "extreme caution," has adopted the ques-
tions set forth earlier in this paper.68 Again, California and Hawaii are, in a sense,
neighboring communities which have experienced a similar turmoil of commu-
nist infiltration in labor and other groups. California has a statute, set forth
above, barring advocates of violent overthrow from admission; but its bar ex-
aminers make no special inquiries of applicants, and "[during the past seven
years, at least, the Committee has not denied an applicant the right to take an
examination on the ground of subversive beliefs or acts."67 Whether this is the
case in Hawaii we do not know, but we do have a report, also discussed above,
of a set of questions almost ludicrous in their intensity. Such inconsistencies may
be attributable quite simply to the composition of the boards at any given pe-
riod.
Whether the momentum of the present period will carry more bar examiners
into the loyalty business we do not undertake to predict. The Louisiana exami-
ners advised us that they are considering a loyalty oath; 8 Minnesota has a pro-
gram under discussion; 9 and two boards replied that they had no loyalty tests
at present, but would take the matter up at their next meeting.7
If our inquiries have prompted them to action, we are frank to confess dis-
may. Our own preferences are for a lessening of loyalty tests, not for their exten-
sion. The present survey leaves us with the. impression that loyalty tests for
lawyers are not so prevalent as one might have expected, taking the situation of
public employees and especially teachers as the crest against which one measures
65Letter from Henry E. Barksdale, Esq., Chairman, Board of Bar Examiners (Nov. 26,
1952).
66 Letter from John B. Scott, Esq., Secretary, Board of Bar Commissioners (Oct. 24, 1952).67Farley, op. cit. supra note 61.
68 Letter from Stephen A. Mascaro, Esq., Ass't Secretary, Committee on Bar Admissions
(Nov. 29, 1952).
69 Letter from Francis T. Ryan, Esq., Secretary, Board of Law Examiners (Dec. 8, 1952).
70 Letters from Edward T. Lazear, Esq., Secretary, State Board of Law Examiners of Wyo-
ming (Dec. 10, 1952), and from Raymond F. Rice, Esq., Acting Secretary, State Board of Law
Examiners of Kansas (Dec. 6, 1952).
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other inundations. At the same time, enough is described here to make it clear,
we think, that our inquiries are not infected with the vice felicitously suggested
by one bar examiner who wrote:" 'Witch hunting' is, of course, very obnoxious
and on the other hand, it is well to guard against another evil, namely witch
hunting for witch hunters."'
Another thing that is, we think, clear is that bar examiners everywhere are
groping for fair resolutions between the demands created by anticommunist
tensions and the common tradition of implicit loyalty that did not have to be
"proved" or sworn to. Such a resolution is possible, provided that the problem of
domestic communism is put into perspective, say in accordance with the esti-
mate of George Kennan, recently Ambassador to Russia:
The American Communist party is today, by an large, an external danger. It repre-
sents a tiny minority in our country; it has no real contact with the feelings of the
mass of our people; and its position as the agency of a hostile foreign power is clearly
recognized by the overwhelming mass of our citizens. 72
To those who agree with this view, who accept the authoritative estimates of
J. Edgar Hoover that membership in the Communist party has shrunk to a few
thousand,7 3 who noted the insignificant showing of revolutionary groups of any
description in the recent election, and who do not attribute communist tenden-
cies to everyone with whom they disagree, we offer the following tentative
recommendations.
1. As for test oaths, we do not propose here to restate the historical and legal
case against them. If a legislature adopts one applicable to lawyers in a form
that will currently be considered valid, then the examiners and the courts have
no alternative but to administer it, and to deny admission to applicants who will
not subscribe to it, or who, on undisputed facts, cannot honestly subscribe to it.
Loyalty oaths especially for lawyers have come into discussion largely as the re-
sult of the action of the American Bar Association in recommending that all
lawyers take an oath forswearing both Communist party membership and ad-
herence to "Marxism-Leninism" 7 4---a piece of jargon with no past, and, we
trust, no future legally operative significance. Quite aside from the peculiar in-
felicity of the ABA oath 7 5 it has been criticised from all sides as unnecessary and
unworthy of the traditions of the profession. 76 Its failure to achieve adoption,
71 Letter from D. L. Sears, Esq., Chairman, Bar Applicant Committee, Toledo, Ohio (Nov.
19, 1952).
72Kennan, Where Do You Stand on Communism?, N.Y. Times Magazine § 6, p. 7 (May
27, 1951). See also Justice Douglas, dissenting, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
73 See 32 U.S. News 35 (Apr. 11, 1952); N.Y. Times, p. 26, col. 3 (Aug. 30, 1952) ("24,647
known members").
74See Proceedings of the House of Delegates: 1950, 36 A.B.AJ. 948, 972 (1950). See also
The Lawyer's Loyalty Oath, 37 A.B.A.J. 128 (1951).
71See Report, Special Committee on Disbarment of Subversive Members of the Bar, 30
Mich. S.B.J., No. 9, p. 70 (1951); Stason, op. cit. supra note 30.
78 See The Proposed Anti-Communist Oath: Opposition Expressed to Association's Policy,
37 A.B.A.J. 123 et seq. (1951) (Letters in opposition from the Massachusetts Bar, the Ass'n
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though one must note the counterparts promulgated by the Supreme Courts of
Colorado, Oklahoma, and Washington, gives one hope that the question of loy-
alty oaths for lawyers is dormant.
2. Inquiries about criminally subversive activities are not improper, if one ac-
cepts the general assumption that character committees may investigate the
applicant's behavior pretty much at will and may recommend his exclusion if it
finds him not of "good moral character." A uniform feature of applicants' ques-
tionnaires is a demand for information about convictions, arrests, and charges
of crime. Since we now have a variety of criminal seditions on the books," the
chief question open to bar examiners is whether they should single out such of-
fenses for special attention. A counsel of restraint would imply a negative an-
swer.
3. In any case, we believe that routine inquiries to the candidate should be
confined to written forms, and not made the subject of oral examination. If the
examiners feel that they must make some investigation, a printed form has the
advantage of precision and impersonality. It can embody a formula which meets
the requirements of the law and does not expose the examiner to embarrassment
if he (consciously or unconsciously) misstates a key question and reveals his own
prepossessions. Thus (a question reported to us), "Do you have any Communis-
tic or extreme liberal tendencies?" Compare the proposed solution of the Mary-
land bar examiners to their mandate to exclude "subversive persons." They plan
to put on their form the question: "Are you a subversive person as defined by
the Subversive Activities Act of 1949?"7T If the question sounds silly, it is not
the examiners' fault.
4. There are a number of other reasons why any detailed examination on loy-
alty matters, presumably oral, should be avoided as a routine matter. First, as
already suggested, it gives too much scope for the examiner's own views to be
borne in upon presumably impressionable students. If they are his views about
legal ethics and the applicant's role in the legal profession, that is one thing. If
the examiner is a mature lawyer, as he should be, he is an expert on such sub-
jects. But we question the desirability of giving the committee members scope to
lecture applicants on the evils of communism and related subjects. It has been
suggested to us that this is a good opportunity for indoctrination on this vital
topic. We doubt it. And as for the sort of examination required to ferret out the
hidden Communist, we strongly urge examiners not to attempt to supplant the
of the Bar of the City of New York, and from 27 eminent lawyers); Chafee, A Statement to
My Fellow-Lawyers (1951); Koenigsberg and Stavis, Test Oaths: Henry VIII to the American
Bar Association, 11 Lawyers Guild Rev. 111 (1951). Cf. Constitutional Issues Raised by the
Proposed Loyalty Oath for Lawyers, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 529 (1951).
77 Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1950); Internal Security Act, § 4(a),
64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 783 (1951). The state statutes are compiled in Gellhorn,
The States and Subversion 397 et seq. (1952). Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
78Letter from Wilson K. Barnes, Esq., Secretary, Board of Law Examiners (Dec. 16,
1952).
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FBI. It leads to displays of ignorance, such as asserting that Americans for
Democratic Action was on the Attorney General's List (the questioner had
American Youth for Democracy in mind, it turned out), asking if the American
Civil Liberties Union wasn't a communist organization, and the following
colloquy:
"And the United World Federalists. I've never heard of that. What's that?"
(From another member of the examining committee) "Oh, I wouldn't worry
about that. Everyone up on the North Shore belongs to that."
It also leads to downright improprieties, like the following:
"Did you vote for Henry Wallace in 1948?"
"No, I voted for Harry Truman."
"Don't tell me that-we don't have the right to ask you that."
The consequence of aimlessly hectoring students about membership in left-
wing organizations, like the National Lawyers' Guild, may obviously be, as the
word gets along, to discourage other students from joining such organizations.
However desirable such a result might seem to the individual examiner, he
should hardly use his official capacity to achieve it. Worse, the use of test ques-
tions, such as the applicant's views on Communists at the bar, and the insistence
on "right" answers, may lead to a deplorable attitude on the part of applicants.
The affair of George A. made a considerable impression on his contemporaries
at Chicago, one of whom wrote as follows: "Although I have never been a Com-
munist nor a member of organizations on the Attorney-General's list, my atti-
tudes are such that had I acted with complete sincerity, I would not have replied
simply 'no sir' to the question I was asked [about membership in subversive or-
ganizations]. But, I decided in advance, as did most of my friends, to give the
answers best fitted to admission to the Bar without difficulty."
5. When is it proper to bar an applicant for disloyalty? We have framed the
question in such a way that the answer, we suggest, is "never," for the reason
that loyalty and disloyalty are concepts too elusive to be used as the basis for
decision. The same objection, superficially, may be made to "lack of good moral
character," which would presumably underlie a disloyalty rejection. Even if we
equate "lack of good moral character" with "moral turpitude," a rough equiva-
lent used as the catch phrase in disbarment proceedings, it must be admitted
that the phrases lack precise meaning throughout the law.79 But they are not
empty vessels in the context of admission or discipline. Like many such terms,
use has encrusted them with meaning; doubtless "disloyalty" could also come to
have a meaning in bar examining, as it supposedly has for the Loyalty Review
Board.
But the perils of launching a jurisprudence of loyalty in times like these are so
7- See, generally, Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Dis-
barment, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 9 (1935); Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 Col. L. Rev. 838
(1951); The Imposition of Disciplinary Measures for the Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 Col. L.
Rev. 1039 (1952). See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). That exclusion may rest
on slighter grounds than disbarment, see In re Stepsay, 15 Cal. 2d 71, 98 P. 2d 489 (1946).
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obvious that we urge the examiners to stick to the familiar. Specifically, a person
who presently advocates or works toward the overthrow of the government by
unconstitutional means, whether as a Communist or a philosophical anarchist,
may be denied admission, for the reasons suggested at the beginning of this es-
say. It may be said that he is not of good moral character, because he contem-
plates criminally reprehensible conduct, or that he is not fit to practice law, be-
cause he will not uphold the Constitution. On the other hand, George A.'s de-
fense of the "right" of revolution by those who believe that lost democratic
processes can only thus be restored should not, standing alone,80 have barred
him, because he made it quite clear that he had not the slightest intention him-
self of promoting such a revolution.
For another example, we think that ex-Communists are clearly admissible, if
the committee is reasonably satisfied that they are no longer members. The
California81 and New Haven County8 authorities have confronted this case, and
reached that result.
But as one moves back from these relatively easy examples of eligibility to-
ward the equally clear one of ineligibility-that of the currently conspiring revo-
lutionary-hard borderline cases crop up to stub the toe. We will mention two.
First, assume an applicant who candidly confesses to a secret sincere belief in the
necessity and desirability of a revolution along communist lines. With equal
candor, he assures the examiners that he is a timid soul who prefers books to
barricades, and that he never has lifted and never will lift a finger to advocate or
support the revolution he dreams of. This improbable hypothesis highlights the
constitutional freedom to believe as one will. Looking from the bar examiner's
standpoint at this case (which is not the same as George A.'s belief in the moral
right to revolt), it seems plausible to say that such a person lacks the "belief in
lawful procedures" that the assembled law teachers consider essential to their
profession, 3 and that his subversive thoughts show a poor moral character. But
if the examiners propose to apply the sanction of exclusion, they should first re-
read the several opinions in American Communications Association v. Douds.84
There they will find the six sitting members of the Court evenly divided over the
' 
80 Another element in his case was his refusal to answer questions bearing on party mem-
bership or political views. Our personal impression of the case, based upon the record avail-
able to us (see note 5 supra), is that the Committee really had no occasion to ask him such
questions, for his statement of the "right" of revolution, though gratuitous, was clearly hypo-
thetical, and all other information about him, it appears, was highly favorable. But, once the
Committee decided it had reasonable grounds for suspicion, then we think it had the power to
ask him if he was a member of the Communist party, defining such membership, as the Com-
mittee did, to refer to a conspiratorial movement to overthrow the government. There were
other issues developed in the two hearings; they are either related to the principal ones (e.g.,
George A. saw no objection to admitting Communists to the bar) or are examples of the byways
into which oral examination can stray. Compare the comments of Professor Malcolm Sharp
in Anastaplo, op. cit. supra note 5, following p. 79.
81Farley, op. cit. supra note 61.
82Student questionnaire.
81 See p. 481 supra. 84 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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validity of that part of the Taft-Hartley oath requiring a denial of belief in the
overthrow of the government by unconstitutional means. Against the firm posi-
tion, as expressed by Mr. justice Jackson, that "While the Governments, State
and Federal have expansive powers to curtail action, and some small powers to
curtail speech or writing, I think neither has any power, on any pretext, directly
or indirectly to attempt foreclosure of any line of thought,",, the Chief Justice
could only dilate on the perils to commerce of the political strike, and promise
that the Court would be firm to resist any less warranted intrusion on belief.
The second hard case is the converse of the first, and probes the assumption
that Communist party membership is an immediate badge of outlawry. Suppose
the candidate admits present membership, but urges stoutly (and again credi-
bly) that he does not advocate violent overthrow, nor does the party mean to
him any more than an instrument of social reform-or even a setting for social
diversion. If this seems preposterous in 1953, it certainly was not so in recent
years. We have it on the authority of the House Committee on Un-American
Activities (complaining that some of its friendly witnesses had lost their jobs)
that
An examination of the testimony of a large group of these witnesses conclusively re-
veals that they did not join the Communist Party to participate in any action designed
to overthrow the United States. They joined in some instances to defeat Hitler, or
support labor, and it was only long after their association with the Communist Party
that they learned the true intent and purpose of this organization."8
The case may be brought closer to the present problem by considering the group
of Los Angeles lawyers alleged to be Communists. According to testimony, un-
controverted to date, by ex-members before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities,87 this was an unwieldy, earnest, and apparently boring
study group of dues-paying party members who carried on busy practices de-
spite the strain of trying to master the theories of dialectical materialism, the
intricacies of which were what caused some of the apostates to fall by the way-
side.88 The testimony of two of them was explicit that force and violence were
never advocated at the meetings.ss8 a If any charges of unethical conduct have
been made against these lawyers-we assume that it is not yet unethical to
specialize in labor and civil liberties matters-we have not heard of it. The worst
public offense of some of them, in our perhaps overly fastidious opinion, was in
trying to outdo in bad manners the Committee on Un-American Activities
when it sought to question them.89
81 Ibid., at 442 (Jackson, J., dissenting in part).
,6 Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, Annual Report for
the Year 1952, at p. 3 (1952).
s7 Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives,
Communist Activities Among Professional Groups in the Los Angeles Area-Part 1, 82d
Cong. 2d Sess. 2,501-2,630 (1952).
s Ibid., at 2,535-42.
88a Ibid., at 2,540 and 2,582. 89 Ibid., Part 3, at 3,903 et seq.
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What about these two cases? By eliminating from them any question of
credibility and any room for inference about either the candidate's present belief
or his predictable future action, we have made them untrue to real life, and thus
perhaps insoluble in real life. A flesh and blood committee would balk at the
promise of the revolutionary dreamer always to uphold the laws; but do not
many of us spin lawless fantasies without ever acting on them? The same com-
mittee could be excused for rejecting, after three years of Korea, the peaceful
protestations of the party member; but do not men cling to hopeless faiths with-
out impairing their moral character? The problems cannot, in fact, be isolated
from the beliefs and faiths of committee members and from issues of credibility
and proof.
6. The usual proposition that the applicant has the burden of proof of estab-
lishing his good moral character should not be literally applied to loyalty mat-
ters. Opposing views on this point are well developed by bar examiners. The
chairman of the Florida board writes:
I give great weight to the proposition that the practice of law is a privilege and that
every applicant who seeks admission should carry the burden of establishing his com-
plete loyalty to our constitutional government and that he is in quite a different posi-
tion from one seeking employment in some other undertaking. It does not seem to me
that the burden should be upon the examiners in such case to establish that the
applicant's loyalty is doubtful.90
One may agree, hesitantly, that the burden should not be on the examiners; but
at the same time there should still be room in American life for a strong pre-
sumption of loyalty. As the chairman of an Ohio character committee wrote:
It has been uniformly true that with the general information readily available concern-
ing applicants who have appeared before our Committee, we have considered all appli-
cants completelybeyond suspicion of treason andhave consideredit unnecessaryto make
any investigation calculated to develop treasonable beliefs or acts. 9'
Related to the burden of proof are such matters as making an adequate rec-
ord, referring findings to some reasonable standards, and disclosing all the evi-
dence on which the committee acted, so that, if the applicant appeals, there will
be something on which the reviewing court can act. Though committees often
undertake to treat communications made to them as confidential, for the sake
of encouraging disclosures, it seems unlikely that they could use such communi-
cations as a basis for an adverse decision and then refuse to disclose them as part
of the record on an appeal." While the episode that follows is doubtless atypical,
90 Watts, op. cit. supra note 63.
91 Sears, op. cit. supra note 71.
"The California examiners' rules specifically provide that an applicant shall be informed of
all information on which an adverse decision is based. Rules for Admission to the Bar 35
(West Pub. Co., 1951). At the other extreme, the Houston (Texas) Bar Association ap-
parently attempts to exact a waiver of disclosure of information received by the board.
Applicant's Questionnaire, Question No. 41(b). State cases are inconclusive. Compare Re
Application of Crum, 103 Ore. 296, 204 Pac. 948 (1922) (full procedural rights guaranteed),
with In re Frank, 293 IlL. 263, 127 N.E. 640 (1920). Prior to In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561
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it illustrates the need for a little more firmness in applying some principles of
administrative procedure to these hearings. In a speech to the Washington
(State) Bar Association, a member of the committee said:
[W]e have spent many hours during the last year in respect to an applicant from
an eastern city whose record is such that we feel he is inherently an enemy of the state.
He was not allowed to take the examination. We are, however, surprised that the
record which we made, and which was the best record we could make, was not taken
to the Supreme Court and our ruling challenged. It has not yet been, and we are think-
ing maybe he thinks we know more than we do.93
7. If the procedures and policies we have proposed were uniformly followed,
no doubt very few denials-even fewer than at present-would result. We see no
reason to be alarmed at this prospect. Though it is theoretically more desirable,
as the Secretary of the Alabama Bar Examiners wrote, "to keep out the unwor-
thy than to remove them after admission,"9 4 you first have to find the unwor-
thy. Character tests are only meaningful as guides to future conduct. It is a diffi-
cult responsibility in any case to say that a man just out of law school may never
practice; it is not surprising that denials are few. If a lawyer later shows that he
is unworthy of the trust that has been reposed in him, adequate disciplinary pro-
cedures are everywhere available. There is then more of a life record on which to
judge, and on which to base a defense.9 5
(1945), there was no recognition of a federally protected guaranty of due process in state bar
admission proceedings. Cf. Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wal. (U.S.) 130 (1872) (exclusion of a
female applicant not a denial of privileges and immunities of 14th Amendment). But in the
Summers case, the Court held that "a claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a
state and a denial of that right is a controversy" (325 U.S. at 568) which may be reviewed
when federal questions are raised, and added: "The responsibility for choice as to personnel of
its bar rests with Illinois. Only a decision which violated a federal right secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment would authorize our intervention." 325 U.S. at 570-71. The Supreme
Court has not further clarified the scope of constitutional limitations on state admission pro-
cedures, but one federal court has recently considered this problem. In the course of reversing
the denial of a license to engage in the bail bond business on the ground of a poor moral risk,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said:
"Since a court's order denying an application to practice law is a judicial act, as the Supreme
Court determined in the Summers case, so is a court's order denying an application to do
business as a bondsman. Since the District Court's order is judicial it is (1) appealable and
(2) erroneous because not based upon a proceeding which contains the elements of due process
of law, i.e., a hearing and revelation of all data upon which a decision is to be based. Old
charges never brought to trial, and appellant's innocent mistake of fact on an immaterial
matter, do not support the order. Neither do any secret charges that may have been made by
anonymous informants whom the appellant has had no opportunity to confront and cross-
examine." In re Carter, 192 F. 2d 15 (App. D.C., 1951). But cf. Phipps v. Wilson, 186 F. 2d
748 (C.A. 7th, 1951) (state disbarment proceeding), which held that "due process requires only
that an attorney have a reasonable notice of the charges against him and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to be heard in his defense," citing Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
93 Ashley, Discussion of Bar Applicants Taking Non-Communist Oath, 25 Wash. L. Rev.
374 (1950).
4 Farley, op. cit. supra note 61.
5 Exclusions, on character grounds, of attorney applicants, who will usually have had at
least five years' practice elsewhere, appear to occur much more often than do student ex-
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The foregoing comments should suggest that the responsibility for excluding
subversives from the practice of law is a delicate and burdensome one. At least,
we feel that it should be so viewed by examiners; and we have no doubt that
practically all of them have a professional sense of fair play more rigorous than
the unguarded remarks of the Washington bar examiner quoted above would im-
ply. Our brief references, in this particular context, to such matters as burden of
proof, clarity of standards, adequacy of findings, and scope of review-matters
that are common to any exclusionary or disciplinary proceeding-may suggest
that the bar has leaned too comfortably on the fallacious privilege-right distinc-
tion. The notion that the practice of law is a guarded "privilege," and that no
one has any "right" to practice, and therefore no right to complain of the means
by which he is excluded, is paralleled in the field of loyalty tests for public em-
ployment. One of the few commendable aspects of the loyalty cases in the Su-
preme Court has been the recognition, murky in the Joint Anti-Fascist case,96
and realized only in the recent Oklahoma oath case, 97 that when "only a privi-
lege" comes in the door, due process does not fly out the window.
It is not surprising that in loyalty cases analysis is closer than in those of the
deadbeat or the grafter. It is universally assumed that a disability imposed on
loyalty grounds carries a stain deeper and more indelible than most moral blots.
Aside from the presumption of loyalty mentioned above, we do not propose that
administrative standards should apply in loyalty cases different from those in
other exclusion proceedings. We do hope that loyalty cases may bring to bear on
the whole process the same mistrustful scrutiny that the bar is quick to lavish
on other administrative bodies.
Even if procedures are adequate, we should like to reiterate that the current
legality of exclusion on loyalty grounds-its not-unconstitutionality, if caution
will excuse a barbarism-does not mean that bar examiners have a strong call to
join the Red-hunt.
So far as casual inquiry shows, our brother professions of medicine and ac-
counting, with no lower standards of good moral character than ours, have not
felt the slightest need to probe for pinkness in their applicants.9 8 Lawyers, as
clusions. Survey of the Legal Profession, op. cit. supra note 24, at 255. This difference tends to
support the view expressed above that character committees can act with more assurance in
the case of a practitioner; it may also reflect the shady past of some migrants.
96 joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
9'Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). See Fraenkel, Law & Loyalty, 37 Iowa L.
Rev. 153, 163 (1952), discussing dicta in recent Supreme Court cases foreshadowing the hold-
ing in the Wieman case.
Is State statutes prescribing requirements for licensure of doctors and accountants uni-
formly include "good moral character" provisions. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) §§ 4364,
4611; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Supp., 1952) c. 91, § 4, c. 1101, § 25. Limited inquiry among practitioners
indicates that loyalty tests are unheard of. But cf. Texas Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, Supp.,
1952) Art. 4542a, § 9, requiring each applicant for a license to practice pharmacy to swear
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such, are not privy to strategic secrets like scientists; if their talents take them
into sensitive government areas, they are subject to screening there. Lawyers do
not, like teachers, have the immediate opportunity to corrupt youth that is sup-
posed to be the unchallenged opportunity of the dwindling band of communist
teachers. They do have the opportunity to corrupt justice; and that brings us
back to our initial conflict between the obligation of the lawyer to legality and
the obligation of the Communist to destroy what to him is a part of the capitalist
enslavement. The reader will, we suspect, cock a skeptical eye at the recent
charge of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania that subversive elements are
crippling the administration of the criminal law.99 He may be more impressed
by the judgment of Mr. Austin Canfield, one of the ABA's authorities on com-
munism, that "fifteen or twenty" lawyers are the "master-minds" of the com-
munist conspiracy. 00 We will make a dogmatic assertion that this is a piece of
professional vainglory. The Justice Department's authorities on communism, in
their selection of defendants in Smith Act cases, have so far singled out only one
lawyer.' 01
If support of communism among practicing lawyers is insignificant, as we be-
lieve it to be, how much less so must it be among the present generation of law
students. The average graduate of this year-assume he is twenty-four-was in
diapers when the Great Depression drove some people into communism; starting
school when the United Front attracted others; still a youth when the Second
Front and similar issues warmed others toward Russia despite earlier disillusion.
These were the peaks of communist sympathy in America. The dwindling role
that "he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he
does not believe in and is neither a member of nor supports any group or organization that
believes in, furthers, or teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by
any illegal or unconstitutional methods" and denying the right to practice pharmacy to any
person within the oath's categories.
99 Statement by Robert A. Woodside to the National Convention of State Attorneys
General, Sea Island, Ga. (Dec. 9, 1952), reported in the Washington Post, p. 2, col. 6 (Dec. 10,
1952).
100 Statement to the House of Delegates of the American Bar Ass'n, Chicago, Ill. (Feb. 25,
1952), reported in the N.Y. Times, p. 14, col. 2 (Feb. 26, 1952).
0 One of the defendants in the Baltimore Smith Act prosecution. Since 1947, 87 persons
have been indicted under the Smith Act as Communist party leaders. N.Y. Times, p. 3 (Jan.
20, 1953); N.Y. Times, p. 4 (Jan. 22, 1953).
The House Committee on Un-American Activities has characterized the National Lawyers
Guild as "the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party." Report on the National
Lawyers Guild, H.Rep. No. 3, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. 123 (1950). See the reply to this report,
The National Lawyers Guild: Legal Bulwark of Democracy, 10 Lawyers Guild Rev. 93 (1950).
The national executive secretary of the Guild testified in April 1952, that its membership
was approximately 2,100. House Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit. supra note 87,
at 2,661. The American Bar Association had, at that time, approximately 43,000 members.
Advance Program, 74th Annual Meeting 26 (1951).
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of the party since then strengthens our agreement with the bar examiner who
wrote:
Speaking solely for myself, I do not think that inquiry into political beliefs has any
place in bar examination work. I think that the study of law is the best training
anyone can have for becoming a good American and I do not think it should be
cluttered up with investigations about political beliefs and whether or not the appli-
cant happens to agree with what a majority of the people may or may not consider at
the moment to be subversive.
10 2
102Letter from Robert E. Seller, Esq., Secretary, Missouri Board of Law Examiners
(Oct. 27, 1952).
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